apgpАктуальные проблемы государства и праваCurrent Issues of the State and Law2587-93402782-3334Тамбовский государственный университет имени Г.Р. Державина10.20310/2587-9340-2023-7-4-504-514apgp-905Research ArticleОБЩАЯ ТЕОРИЯ И ИСТОРИЯ ПРАВА И ГОСУДАРСТВАGENERAL THEORY AND HISTORY OF LAW AND THE STATEИспользование мягкого права в сфере противодействия коррупцииThe use of soft law in anti-corruption fieldhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1066-3783КузнецоваОльга АлексеевнаKuznetsovaOlga A.o715575@mail.ruФГАОУ ВО «Российский государственный университет дружбы народов им. Патриса Лумумбы»РоссияPeoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice LumumbaRussian Federation20232308202674504514Copyright © Кузнецова О.А., 20262026Кузнецова О.А.Kuznetsova O.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://apgp.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/905

Проанализированы иные, помимо уголовно-правовых, способы борьбы с транснациональной коррупцией. К таким способам можно отнести создание неформальных сетей взаимодействия между национальными агентствами по борьбе с коррупцией; участие в борьбе с коррупцией негосударственных игроков, таких как Всемирный банк, Международная торговая палата, и некоммерческих организаций, таких как Трансперенси Интернэшнл; разработка крупными международными банками и агентствами развития режимов расследования и наказания компаний, которые вовлечены в коррупционную деятельность в рамках финансируемых ими проектов; внедрение Модельных кодексов корпоративной этики и функционирование комплаенс-механизмов в корпорациях. Отмечено, что указанные способы особенно выгодны на международном уровне, где отсутствует некий наднациональный суверен, и эффективность межгосударственного сотрудничества остается ограниченной. Сделан вывод о том, что создание новых механизмов, в том числе механизмов «мягкого права», позволяют выработать более разносторонние и эффективные подходы к борьбе с коррупцией. В частности, путем развития механизмов мягкого права, таких как диалог и сохранение репутации, а также создания сетей регулирования, негосударственные организации получают возможность контролировать деятельность корпораций. Отдельно подчеркнуто, что такие механизмы не являются панацеей, однако представляют собой ценный регулятивный ресурс, каковым и должны признаваться мировым сообществом.

The methods of combating transnational corruption, other than criminal law, are analyzed. These methods include the creation of informal networks of interaction between national anti-corruption agencies; participation in combatting corruption by non-state players such as the World Bank, the International Chamber of Commerce, and non-profit organizations such as Transparency International; the development by large international banks and development agencies of regimes for investigating and punishing companies that are involved in corrupt activities within the framework of projects they finance; implementation of Model Codes of Corporate Ethics and the functioning of compliance mechanisms in corporations. It is noted that these methods are especially beneficial at the international level, where there is no supranational sovereign, and the effectiveness of interstate cooperation remains limited. It is concluded that the creation of new mechanisms, including “soft law” mechanisms, makes it possible to develop more versatile and effective anti-corruption approaches. In particular, through the development of soft law mechanisms such as dialogue and face-saving, as well as the creation of regulatory networks, non-state organizations are able to control the activities of corporations. It is emphasized separately that such mechanisms are not a panacea, but they represent a valuable regulatory resource, which should be recognized by the international community.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.